ABSTRACT The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established a new public-private entity for comparative effectiveness research: the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute. The institute is charged with identifying priorities, establishing an agenda, and carrying out comparative effectiveness research. The political process through which the institute was formalized greatly influenced its scope and charge, including the organization's goals, its unique private-public composition, and its funding. In this paper I highlight key moments and offer background and insights into what did and did not end up in the final legislation.
B
y the summer of 2009, the role of comparative effectiveness research in health reform had become a source of both contempt and sincere praise. As town hall meetings resounded with cries to keep the government out of health care and to oppose the creation of "death panels," comparative effectiveness research managed to maintain a great deal of support from a variety of stakeholders, including researchers, industry, and patient groups.
By this time, committees in both the House and the Senate were working on their versions of health reform legislation. Yet major differences between the House and Senate bills remained. At issue was the version passed by the House of Representatives, which called for a governmentbased entity to conduct the research, which would be housed within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). This stood in contrast to the Senate Finance Committee's version, which called for a nongovernmental entity with an independent governance structure. Ultimately, the version signed into law largely reflected the Senate design. The new entity to be established to coordinate the research was named the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.
In this paper I highlight the legislative pathway that led to the institute's creation. I offer insights into the contentious issues that played out behind newspaper headlines, and I examine how important topics such as cost, coverage, and industry influence were dealt with. I also offer a hypothetical scenario of what the institute might have looked like if Republican Scott Brown had not won the vacant Massachusetts Senate seat in January 2010, ending the Democrats' filibusterproof majority in the Senate. Finally, I discuss the aspects of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute that were not necessarily captured in the health reform law but that are critical to ensuring a successful beginning.
Policy Context
The legislative and policy context for the even- staffs for an identifiable entity responsible for the research.
Central to these policy discussions were questions related to the nature and structure of such an entity. Who should have a role in decisionmaking and priority setting? What would the funding mechanism look like? Should comparative effectiveness research findings affect coverage decisions in Medicare? Perhaps the most important question was whether the entity would be located inside or outside of government. These questions would form the basis for some of the major differences between the nature of the research as presented by the House and Senate health care reform bills (see Appendix Exhibit 1).
2
The House introduced a potential organizational structure for a research governance entity in 2007 during the debate over the reauthorization of the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). The House version proposed the formation of a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research based at AHRQ.
Senators Max Baucus (D-MT) and Kent Conrad (D-ND), chairs of the Finance and Budget Committees, respectively, felt that the idea of a public-private entity had more merit. So they subsequently introduced legislation, S 3408, that would establish a Health Care Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute. The senators felt that a nongovernmental entity offered a more efficient and transparent mechanism for the development and dissemination of evidence-based medicine.
In the end, comparative effectiveness research didn't make its way into the CHIP reauthorization bill. However, the influence of the House language carried well into health reform, with large sections of language lifted from one bill to another.
The flurry of congressional action around comparative effectiveness research in 2007 carried forward into the presidential election of 2008. Both major party nominees made comparative effectiveness research a key component of their approach to health reform. In his health care campaign platform, then-Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) identified comparative effectiveness research as "one of the keys to eliminating waste and missed opportunities" and called for "an independent institute to guide reviews and research on comparative effectiveness, so that Americans and their doctors will have accurate and objective information to make the best decisions for their health and well-being." 3 Similarly, the Republican nominee for president, Sen. John McCain of Arizona, said, "We must make public more information on treatment options and doctor records, and require transparency regarding medical outcomes, quality of care, costs and prices. We must also facilitate the development of national standards for measuring and recording treatments and outcomes." 4 Comparative effectiveness research might have seemed bipartisan in the campaign, but after Barack Obama was elected in November 2008, the Republican Party distanced itself from the subject-a change of heart that only became more pronounced as Democrats articulated their principles for health reform.
The Battle Over Research
As prospects of a bipartisan approach to health reform faded in 2009, attacks on comparative effectiveness research as an agent of health care rationing came to dominate much of the discussion. Republicans teamed with various interest groups to propose drastic restrictions on how results of comparative effectiveness research could be used. As the various committees of jurisdiction introduced their versions of health reform legislation, the controversy shifted from an earlier concern-where within or outside the government an entity responsible for the research should be located-to whether the research should be included in health reform at all.
Senior lawmakers, their staffs, and the administration realized that they would need to mount both an offense and a defense to keep the prospects alive for incorporating comparative effectiveness research into health reform legislation. Although the issue was not one that threatened to derail health reform, there were flash points, as well as moments when the tense debate between Republicans and Democrats could have distracted attention from health reform's overall goals.
Senate Process The Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee bill, S 1679, introduced by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) before his death in 2009, sought to create a Center for Health Outcomes Research and Evaluation within AHRQ. The legislation called for an advisory commission with a broad array of stakeholders, and it contained language specifying that comparative effectiveness findings could not be interpreted as mandates for cost, coverage, or treatment.
The attention to cost and coverage reflected the need not only to counter any claims that health reform would lead to rationing, but also to protect the agency from perceptions that it was sponsoring research to be used by Medicare for coverage and reimbursement decisions. Additionally, the HELP Committee bill required a report to be delivered at the end of 2011 to evalu-ate the center's progress, research, and costs and to address whether or not the center should expand its research to encompass other aspects of the health care delivery system, such as management and benefit design.
Sen. Mike Enzi (R-WY) responded almost immediately: "As written, the Kennedy bill creates a new bureaucracy to dictate which treatments to pay for." 5 He joined other Republicans in comparing the entity to the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in England and Wales, raising fears of health care rationing. The comments came at a sensitive time, when support for health reform had been waning. 6 The HELP Committee staff realized that it would need to garner support from a broad swath of stakeholders or risk losing comparative effectiveness research altogether. Accordingly, members gathered letters of support from researchers, disease groups, industry, and consumers in case of an eventual showdown during the markup process, when legislative details are hammered out.
Meanwhile, dozens of amendments from the Republicans poured in. On the first day of the HELP Committee markup of the Kennedy health reform bill, more than twenty GOP amendments called for altering or eliminating the government-based comparative effectiveness research entity, and there were more to follow. But senior Democratic committee staff knew that it was difficult for Republicans to completely eradicate comparative effectiveness research, given the strong support for the research that Senator McCain and others had shown on the campaign trail.
House Process The House followed the HELP Committee's lead with the introduction of its socalled Tri-Committee bill-one bill for all three House committees of jurisdiction. The proposed legislation contained comparative effectiveness provisions that were similar to those in the House Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Bill of 2007 (Appendix Exhibit 1).
2
The provisions of the Tri-Committee bill were built on a foundation of transparency through the government's mechanism of checks and balances on regulatory authority, including the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which would ensure optimal public participation in comparative effectiveness research.
The
The proposal for a nongovernmental entity appealed to many lawmakers. For some, such an entity offered better prospects for robust funding of the research in minority populations-a frequently neglected topic within large governmental agencies. Christensen was among those who took that view.
However, tension mounted with the possibility that the amendment could overturn the long, hard work of House members and reject the idea of a comparative effectiveness research institute as a government-based entity. Ultimately, Representative Christensen withdrew the amendment after staff reached an agreement to settle the issue at a later time.
Although House Democrats agreed that their Tri-Committee bill was far from perfect, they agreed to stand in solidarity behind the version of comparative effectiveness research that they had been crafting for the past four years.
Senate Finance Committee After an August 2009 recess filled with town hall meetings that were characterized by talk of apocryphal "death panels" and public confusion, Senator Baucus introduced the concept of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute into the Senate Finance bill. Its placement in a prominent section of health reform legislation was a signal that the powerful chairman supported comparative effectiveness research and felt strongly about the research institute's role in bending the cost curve and influencing the delivery of health care.
The Finance Committee markup closely resembled the HELP Committee process, with Republicans introducing amendments that would strip out the funding for the research institute, eliminate any consideration of cost in the research, and prohibit research results from being used to make coverage decisions or to deny covThe Republican actions played on public fears that health reform would lead to rationing.
erage. 7 The Republican actions played on public fears that health reform would lead to rationing. Meanwhile, the committee staff on the majority Democratic side had to prepare "fact versus fiction" talking points because of the growing perception that comparative effectiveness research would dictate insurance coverage determinations or prevent Americans from receiving innovative therapies.
Day after day, an endless stream of organizations, citizens, researchers, and thought leaders weighed in with Senate Finance Committee staff. Some warned the staff of the ramifications of using cost-effectiveness in the research and the implications of doing so on expensive treatments, including those stemming from genomics and personalized medicine.
Committee staff carefully considered each comment, realizing that a more transparent process than any previously undertaken by the research community was needed to make comparative effectiveness research politically tolerable. Without transparency at every level-from nominations to the governing board to standards for selecting methodology criteria-the entire effort could collapse.
Mammograms And Holiday Wishes
The White House had, for the most part, remained neutral on the topic of whether comparative effectiveness research should be done inside or outside the government. The administration wanted to support the congressional process by staying out of it, but it was forced to get peripherally involved when the US Preventive Services Task Force released recommendations against routine mammography screening in women under age fifty who had no other risk factors for breast cancer.
The outcry from key members of the cancer community was swift and fierce. Concerns about sending a signal that mammograms were not safe or useful were echoed in prominent newspaper op-ed columns such as the one authored by Otis Brawley, chief medical officer of the American Cancer Society. Brawley stated that the recommendations led to a "rigorous discussion" but could be "messy and confusing to the public." 8 The health and human services (HHS) secretary, Kathleen Sebelius, swiftly repudiated the task force's recommendations and reassured the public that the task force was a group of independent scientists who did not set federal policy or influence coverage decisions, but merely made recommendations as to the worthiness of various prevention measures.
The timing of the guidelines had the potential to derail congressional support for comparative effectiveness. However, Senate and House leaders were not fazed. Leaders in each chamber had successfully shepherded their respective versions of comparative effectiveness entities through the legislative process. They felt confident that they would head into conference to reconcile differences in the bills with a scenario to work out a compromise. Eventually the task force guidelines were undercut by Sen. Barbara Mikulski's (D-MD) amendment to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that mandated coverage for mammogram services in women after age forty.
With the holiday season looming, Senate staff got to work reconciling the differences between the HELP and Finance Committee bills to produce one Senate health reform bill. The language for a public-private effectiveness research institute prevailed. The HELP Committee staff reached a compromise agreement in merging the bills to dedicate funds to AHRQ for the dissemination of research.
The end result signaled the philosophical divide between the House and the Senate over the best path to achieve the common purpose of promoting a transparent, secure process for effectiveness research. The House stance reflected a belief that the government's infrastructure could provide protection from bias and promote research free of conflict. The Senate felt that the best way to accelerate evidence-based medicine while accommodating public concerns was to coordinate and conduct the research through a nongovernmental entity.
Influence Of Industry, Integrity Of Science, And The Cost Conundrum
Advocates for both versions of comparative effectiveness research-in and out of the government-accelerated their efforts to influence the outcome. One effort in particular, a commentary written in the New England Journal of Medicine, had a lasting effect. In their commentary, Harry Selker and Alistair Wood cited Another key objective was the need to preserve the independence of the scientific process.
concerns that "provisions ceding substantial influence to the medical products industries that have a major interest in the outcomes of such research" could challenge the independence of the scientific process. 9 Their critique caused Senate staff to address these issues head-on. First, staff rewrote the legislative language to make it clear that industry representatives would constitute a small fraction of the governing body. They also increased the number of physicians on the institute's board of governors from three to four, and they underscored that transparency was a top priority for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.
Another key objective was the need to preserve the independence of the scientific process, free from censorship or bias. Senate leaders did not want even a hint in the legislation that scientists or others carrying out comparative effectiveness research would lack independence. To that end, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) modified the language to ensure freedom of publication and to protect contracted research from censorship.
In the same frenetic time period, opponents of all forms of comparative effectiveness research took to the airwaves, print media, and town halls to stir up fear. In a prominently placed op-ed, Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), who is also a physician, stated that comparative effectiveness research panels "could effectively dictate coverage options and ration care for plans that participate in the state insurance exchanges created by the bill." 10 With so much at stake, Senate language was clarified yet again to reinforce the fact that findings published by the research institute would not dictate payment, coverage, or policy recommendations. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to permit the Institute to mandate coverage, reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer," the final legislative language said.
At the same time, the language also managed to thread the needle on coverage. It explicitly did not bar the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) or private payers from using the research to inform their own separate coverage decisions. Furthermore, the bill stated that the HHS secretary could use the research to make a coverage determination under Medicare through an iterative and transparent process that includes public comment and considers the effect on subpopulations.
Senate staff reviewed every aspect of the proposed legislative language to emphasize the distinctly different role of the institute as a research catalyst, not a regulator or an entity that would influence coverage, reimbursement, and other important factors.
The House remained patient, still anticipating that it would be able to strengthen provisions related to conflicts of interest and the influence of industry during a conference between the two chambers. But overall, House members were pleased with the direction of the Senate's changes.
What If Scott Brown Had Not Won?
Any need to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions of comparative effectiveness research became moot in January 2010, when Republican Scott Brown was elected to the Massachusetts Senate seat vacated by the death of Senator Kennedy. At that point, any thought of adopting the House's vision of a governmentrun comparative effectiveness research institute fell by the wayside.
Overall, the Senate version preserved important but distinctly secondary roles for the heads of AHRQ and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). It also retained an emphasis on training the next generation of health services researchers, and awarded money to AHRQ to disseminate research findings and link databases and disease registries to improve evidence.
It is tempting to wonder what would have happened if the process of compromise between the House and Senate had moved forward as planned. For several reasons, it is likely that a public-private entity still would have emerged that largely resembled the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute. First and foremost, the structure proposed in the Senate bill had a great deal of stakeholder support. The House also had a growing number of members who, like Representative Christensen, voiced support for the public-private entity.
On the other hand, it is also likely that legislative language would have emerged altering the composition of the governing board to include greater government representation and less industry representation. To address concerns raised by the House, the final bill would probably have had language protecting research methods from heavy stakeholder influence. As the legislative language now stands, the research institute's methodology committee, which is charged with setting standards for comparative effectiveness, reports to the governing board, instead of being an independent body with the ability to give guidance on methodology without any other intermediate review process.
It's also interesting to consider what might happen if congressional control shifts from the Democrats to the Republicans following the November 2010 elections. Because it was the shift to Democratic control in 2007 that helped propel comparative effectiveness research, could support for the research vanish entirely if Democrats lose their majorities in either the House or Senate, or both?
At present, that outcome seems unlikely, given how difficult it would be to reverse the statute without an outcry from the stakeholders who worked hard to ensure the research institute's survival in the Senate process.
Looking Forward
Setting aside the hypothetical scenarios of what might have been, Congress, the Obama administration, and the public must look forward. The process of starting a multimilliondollar nonprofit organization is daunting for any set of leaders. But prospects for the PatientCentered Outcomes Research Institute to have a major impact on the health care system will depend on the independence of scientists from the influence of industry, advocates, or other stakeholders. This principle was crucial to the survival of the institute in the legislative process and will continue to be the foundation upon which the integrity, validity, and respect for the entity and its research will be built.
The institute's first governing board, which is to be selected by the comptroller general and was scheduled to be announced on September 23, 2010, will need to be entrepreneurial in a way that has rarely been accomplished in research. The institute's first chair should swiftly set a strong professional tone with the other board members and with staff charged with carrying out the statute. The institute's funding structure gives it a great deal of fiscal security that will enable its officers to predict grant-making priorities for a relatively long period of time. That is rare for a federal research agency; such agencies are usually subject to the vagaries of the annual budget process.
Clearly, the board members of the PatientCentered Outcomes Research Institute will need to maintain public trust. The board's actions will be scrutinized for both praise and easy dismissal. Furthermore, board members will have to negotiate deftly the same currents that swirled around the creation of the institute: the media, patients, politicians, the federal government, and others who carry agendas not yet articulated.
It is likely that the science of comparative effectiveness research will continue to be used as a referendum on President Obama and the Democratic leadership. However, the possibility for the research to provide useful information to clinicians and patients is so great that passage of the legislation and creation of the new institute are truly historic. ▪ The author acknowledges Meredith Hughes for her assistance with editing and review of the manuscript.
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